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Abstract 
“Women Have the Right to Fight!”: The Contested Legacy of Second-Wave Feminism 
and Anti-Rape Politics in the Trials of Inez Garcia, 1974-1977 
by 
Megan E. Feulner 
 
Advisor: Professor Shifra Sharlin 
My paper takes as its central focus the trials of Inez Garcia, a woman who was charged with the 
murder of a man who helped rape her in Soledad, CA in 1974. Garcia’s trial in 1974, in which 
she was convicted of second-degree murder, and her retrial in 1977, in which the ruling was 
reversed, is often remembered as a cause célèbre of the second-wave women’s movement that 
united diverse activists and yielded a major feminist legal victory. However, I argue that close 
examination of the trial and the feminist activism around it reveals a more paradoxical legacy. 
First, I track how Garcia functioned as both a literal and figurative political cause in which 
myriad second-wave feminists mapped out a highly conflicting politics of self-defense in her 
name. Second, I contend that the trial has had minimal impact on the broader feminist 
antiviolence movement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
Table of Contents 
Page 
Abstract           iv 
Introduction           1 
Chapters  
 1 A Feminist Cause: The Trials of Inez Garcia, 1974-1977    15 
 2 Paradoxes of Second-Wave Feminist Politics     28 
Bibliography           52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Introduction 
 
WOMEN HAVE THE RIGHT TO FIGHT!  
STOP RAPE! 
FREE INEZ!1 
 
So concludes the first page of “Inez Garcia: Womanpride Fighting Back,” a short booklet 
authored in 1975 by a group of California-based feminists who had organized for the cause of 
Inez Garcia, a woman who was charged with the murder of a man who helped rape her in 
Soledad, CA.2 Frequently remembered as a cause célèbre of the second-wave women’s 
movement, Garcia’s trial in 1974, in which she was convicted of second-degree murder, and her 
retrial in 1977, in which the ruling was reversed, is one of the major feminist legal cases in which 
activists sought to rearrange the standard tropes regarding violence against women and the 
meaning of self-defense in both the U.S. law and culture at large. In focusing on the trials of Inez 
Garcia, I hope to offer a critical examination not only of specific issues for “one of the most 
controversial feminist legal cases of the decade,” as the Village Voice characterized it in 1976, 
but also a lens by which to probe more general considerations for feminist antiviolence history 
and theory.3  
In a brief introductory essay, I outline the theoretical and historiographical contexts that 
inform my reading. Specifically, I ask: what are the stakes in considering Garcia’s trial on its 
own terms? What particular legacies of second-wave feminism complicate and contest the trial’s 
broader historical meanings? Following the introduction, I then give a detailed summary of 
Garcia’s legal battle from her arrest in March 1974 to her acquittal in March 1977. Because my 
                                                            
1 “Inez Garcia: Womanpride Fighting Back,” pamphlet by the Free Inez Garcia Committee, 
1975. Special Collections, University of Michigan Library. 
2 Ibid.  
3 Suzanne Gordon, “Is Murder a Just Response to Rape,” Village Voice, February 9, 1976. 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1299&dat=19760209&id=8vZNAAAAIBAJ&sjid=Pos
DAAAAIBAJ&pg=5968,2706796. 
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broader argument hinges on the complex relationship between feminism and antiviolence reform 
efforts, this narrative provides a critical lens into the reasons this case in particular drew such 
intense and widespread activist support in the 1970s. I use a range of sources—from memoirs, 
alternative press, and mainstream media coverage—to capture the overall tenor of shifting 
activist and press dialogue throughout the course of the two trials. In the final section, I hope to 
complicate the legacy of Garcia’s trial as evidence of feminist achievement and progress. More 
specifically, Garcia’s trial is often remembered as a major feminist legal victory and a site for 
diverse coalitional activism. I argue, however, that close examination of the trial and its activism 
resists simplistic interpretation. I make two main arguments. First, I track how Garcia functioned 
as both a literal and figurative political cause in which myriad second-wave feminists mapped 
out a highly conflicting politics of self-defense in her name. Second, and consequently, I contend 
that the theme of widespread feminist embrace of Garcia obscures the fact that this was a single 
legal victory—one with minimal impact on the broader feminist antiviolence movement.    
There are several reasons why I chose to focus on the Garcia case. First, the lack of 
detailed, critical inquiry into the specific components of the trial merits consideration. Garcia’s 
legal battle is often mentioned in histories of the second-wave women’s movement as one of the 
central feminist rape-self-defense trials that fostered collaboration between diverse activists at 
the national level in a period otherwise burdened by identity politics and separatist organizing.4 
                                                            
4 Sociologist Winifred Breines, for instance, describes the self-defense trials and the anti-rape 
agenda as a key rallying point for activists often divided over racial and class differences. She 
writes, “Campaigns in defense of women, usually poor and sometimes of color, who were 
victims of sexual violence and who sometimes had killed the perpetrator, brought together 
diverse women who otherwise would not have found common bonds.” Winifred Breines, The 
Trouble Between Us: An Uneasy History of White and Black Women in the Feminist Movement 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 157. For more general discussion of the popular 
feminist self-defense trials, cf. Bevacqua, Rape on the Public Agenda, 127-129; Brownmiller, In 
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Other popular trials at the time include that of Yvonne Wanrow, a Native American woman who 
fatally shot a child molester on her reservation in 1972; and Joan Little, an African-American 
women who stabbed a white jail guard to death when he attempted to rape her in 1974.5 But 
despite its importance, no recent work examines in depth Garcia’s trial on its own terms.6 
Claiming Garcia’s trial as part of the rich tradition of coalitional feminist activism certainly fits 
with her story in a broader sense; it is equally important to consider the particular context in 
which her trial unfolded—one that is markedly different in many respects from that of Little, 
Wanrow, and others.7  
I take my cue here from philosopher Linda Martín Alcoff’s arguments in favor of 
clarifying specific forms of discrimination as a better means to challenge them.8 In her 2006 
book Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self, Alcoff describes how “race and racism” in 
the U.S. function through the fixed terms of “…what many theorists call the ‘black/white 
paradigm….’”9 In effect, any identity group that falls outside the white label is by default 
considered black—a process of racial categorization that then conceals the myriad forms of 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Our Time, 218-222; Jones, Women Who Kill, 317-331; Rosen, The World Split Open, 182-183; 
Valk, Radical Sisters, 172-174.  
5 Many scholars also include the trial of Dessie Woods, an African-American woman who fatally 
shot a white man who tried to rape Woods and her friend while hitchhiking in 1975. The story of 
Deborah Kantaeng, another woman from California who shot and killed her alleged rapist, also 
made headlines as news of Garcia’s conviction broke in October 1974. See “Man’s Death Probed 
in Rape Case,” Hartford Courant, October 6, 1974. 3B2, ProQuest Historical Newspapers 
(552407219).  
6 Journalist Jim Wood’s The Rape of Inez Garcia remains the only book-length investigation of 
the Garcia trial. Published in 1976 to mixed reviews, the book ends after her 1974 conviction. 
See Jim Wood, The Rape of Inez Garcia (New York: Putnam, 1976).  
7 Danielle McGuire’s precise appraisal of Joan Little’s case is exemplary in illustrating the merit 
of analyzing each trial in terms of specific historical legacies. See McGuire, At the Dark End of 
the Street, 246-278.  
8 Linda Martín Alcoff, “Latinos, Asian Americans, and the Black-White Binary,” chapt. 11 in 
Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
9 Ibid., 248.  
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racism in particular historical, social, and legal contexts. While Alcoff acknowledges that at 
times racism functions in analogous ways for diverse identity groups, she ultimately argues that 
“the means and ideology” tend to differ.10 She sums up two consequences of defining race 
through the black/white binary: it falsely bolsters “a sense of inevitability to white domination;” 
and it conflates race with “color alone.”11 To the latter point, she writes, “Racial oppression 
works on multiple axes…with color being the most dominant and currently the most pernicious. 
But color is not exhaustive of all the forms racial oppression can take.”12 Thus, in more concrete 
terms, the history of the racial oppression of African-Americans is not identical with that of 
Latinos or Asian Americas in the U.S. (to use two of her examples).  
I have paused to recount Alcoff’s arguments because representations of Garcia in 
feminist and media accounts has as much to do with her distinct position as a Latina women as 
with her better known symbolic status as a woman who defended herself against rape. Recurring 
focus on Garcia’s reputation as a faithful wife, her religious devotion and, following her 
conviction in 1974, her erratic behavior and feminine appearance point to discrete channels of 
discrimination that go beyond any single categorization of her case as about, for example, 
universal constructions of gender. Most importantly, the failure to unpack what Alcoff terms the 
“multiple axes” of racism—and by extension the other forms of discrimination that work through 
interrelated channels—has implications for the problematic trajectory of feminist antiviolence 
theories today. 
Second, in-depth examination of feminist interest in Garcia shows how debates played 
out in the course of forging feminist politics and theories of rape and self-defense. In her 2013 
                                                            
10 Alcoff, Visible Identities, 263. 
11 Ibid., 256. 
12 Ibid., 259.  
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book Feeling Women’s Liberation, Victoria Hesford argues for more nuanced engagement with 
our feminist pasts—one that deeply informs my own reading of the history of the women’s 
movement, the case of Inez Garcia, and the abundant activism that emerged in turn.13 Buoyed by 
a desire to parse the vexed relationship between feminist and queer writings, Hesford suggests 
resisting the preemptive instinct to declare feminism’s significance at the outset. Instead, she 
advocates for an “attention to the productive detail of the women’s liberation movement,” or the 
practice of tracking the processes and contentions by which feminist activism emerged.14 She 
elaborates on the historical and affective stakes in opting for ambiguity over resolution:  
Reading along the grain of the movement’s archive opens up the complexity of the 
movement’s eventfulness to a scrutiny that does not reduce or foreclose the possibilities 
of meaning inherent to it; it also invites us to pay the kind of loving attention to a past 
that might make us want to turn away from it, rather than toward it.15 
 
At base, Hesford’s appeal requires the casting off of linearity in favor of multivalent, even 
paradoxical analysis that captures the “complex, contradictory, heterogeneous mess of any 
movement of era.”16 Moreover, the women’s movement in the 1970s was by no means 
“inevitable.”17 In the specific case of Inez Garcia, for instance, feminist support of Garcia was 
never unanimous since activists approached self-defense in contradictory ways.  Further, some 
materials illustrate conventional narratives about second-wave feminist politics, such as an 
overreliance on gender essentialism, static notions of patriarchal oppression, or the articulation of 
a collective identity as espoused, for example, in Chicana feminist writer Marge Piercy’s searing 
                                                            
13 Victoria Hesford, Feeling Women’s Liberation (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013). 
14 Ibid., 6. 
15 Ibid., 13. 
16 Ibid., 12. 
17 Ibid., 10. 
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poem “For Inez Garcia.”18 Yet other documents chronicle less obvious concerns like the 
ambiguous relationship between feminism and violence in general—a topic that prompted Gloria 
Steinem to question the place of “vigilantism” in the movement in the May 1975 issue of Ms. 
Magazine devoted to Garcia.19 The trial of Inez Garcia is thus a site for exploring the process of 
claiming self-defense as a feminist issue.  
Third, and most important, this historical moment is relevant to contemporary criticisms 
of feminist antiviolence politics. On the one hand, the coalitional support that Garcia attracted is 
significant in lieu of the following decade. The case stands in contradiction to what Lynn 
Chancer has described as the extreme “partialization” of identity-based social movements—or 
the stark splintering of racial and gender causes—in “high-profiles” trials in the 1980s like the 
“Central Park Jogger” case.20 Moreover, Garcia’s acquittal on the grounds of legitimate self-
defense laid the groundwork for other explicitly feminist legal arguments, such as the “battered 
women’s defense.”21 But viewed in hindsight, the claim that legal reforms constitute a victory for 
the feminist anti-rape movement is in itself highly problematic. First, statistical underreporting 
for rape remains low as do arrest, prosecutorial, and conviction rates in cases of sexual assault.22 
This fact is even more pronounced for minority women—despite the higher incidence of 
                                                            
18 Marge Piercy, Early Grrrl: The Early Poems of Marge Piercy (Wellfleet, MA: The Leapfrog 
Press, 1999), 62-64.  
19 Gloria Steinem, “But What Do We Do With Our Rage?,” Ms. Magazine 111, no. 11 (May 
1975): 51.  
20 Lynn Chancer, High-Profile Crimes: When Legal Cases Become Social Causes (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005), 143.  
21 Victoria Law, “Sick of the Abuse: Feminist Responses to Sexual Assault, Battering, and Self-
Defense,” In The Hidden 1970s: Histories of Radicalism. Edited by Dan Berger (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2010), 43. 
22 For a summary of international statistics on reporting, prosecution, and conviction rates in rape 
cases, see Mary P. Koss, “Restoring Rape Survivors,” Annals of the New York Academy of 
Sciences 1087, no.1 (2006): 209-218. 
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violence committed against them.23 Susan Caringella points out that this is, in part, a product of 
feminist activism over time. By the late 1980s, for instance, feminists largely abandoned rape as 
a significant issue because of their extensive legal achievements. In turn, less consideration was 
given to the overall efficacy of laws once implemented.24  
Additionally, feminist legal gains are deeply embedded in conservative state policies. 
Maria Bevacqua, for instance, observes that feminist reforms achieved mainstream reception 
largely because they aligned with the conservative “law-and-order agenda of the 1970s [which] 
was informed by a pronounced white fear of minority criminality.”25 In particular, a growing 
body of scholarship has shown mainstream feminist antiviolence activism to be complicit with 
the neoliberal ideologies of racism, mass incarceration, securitization, and surveillance.26 In her 
2008 book In an Abusive State: How Neoliberalism Appropriated the Feminist Movement 
Against Sexual Violence, Kristin Bumiller argues the radical origins of the feminist antiviolence 
movement have been largely diminished through an “alliance” with the neoliberal state—an 
historical development that has had devastating effects on survivors of rape and domestic 
violence.27  
Bumiller describes in detail the consequences of this alignment between the feminist 
antiviolence movement and the neoliberal state. First, early feminist discourse on rape, expressed 
                                                            
23 Beth Richie, Arrested Justice: Black Women, Violence, and America’s Prison Nation (New 
York: New York University Press, 2012), 40-43. 
24 Susan Caringella, Addressing Rape Reform in Law and Practice (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2009), 1-2. 
25 Bevacqua, Rape on the Public Agenda, 119. 
26 See Kristin Bumiller, In an Abusive State: How Neoliberalism Appropriated the Feminist 
Movement Against Sexual Violence (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008); Marie 
Gottschalk, The Prison and The Gallows: The Politics of Mass Incarceration in America (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Beth Richie, Arrested Justice: Black Women, 
Violence, and America’s Prison Nation (New York: New York University Press, 2012). 
27 Bumiller, In an Abusive State, 2. 
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in the language of “gender war,” has facilitated narrow, misleading, and racialized labeling of 
stereotypical victims and criminals. These tropes, which have been recycled by the media, the 
police, and the courts, delimit credibility and access to justice.28 Next, the surveillance function 
of the social service sector drives rape victims into the role of “clients” to be managed, while 
also forcing women of low socioeconomic status into further dependence on the welfare state (an 
institution that is increasingly hostile to their needs).29 Bumiller further notes the frequent use of 
women’s antiviolence rhetoric and funding to bolster the “crime control” imperatives of the state 
which ultimately perpetuate these cycles.30 This is perhaps most apparent in her observation that 
the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), the only national piece of legislation on gender 
violence, allocates the vast majority of its funds to “prevention” measures like police training at 
the expense of more direct victim services like shelters.31  
The racial and class dimensions of gender violence that get buried in mainstream feminist 
activism are the central concern of Beth Richie’s 2012 book Arrested Justice: Black Women, 
Violence, and America’s Prison Nation. While the severing of race and gender issues is certainly 
not a new phenomenon, Richie argues that it has taken on a new urgency in our current political 
climate which she terms “the buildup of America’s prison nation.”32 The “prison nation” is an 
expansive term that denotes “the ideological and public policy shifts that have led to the 
increased criminalization of disenfranchised communities of color, more aggressive law 
enforcement strategies for norm-violating behavior, and an undermining of civil and human 
                                                            
28 Bumiller, In an Abusive State, 16-35. 
29 Ibid., 63-95, 6. 
30 Ibid., 36-62. 
31 Ibid., 144-145. 
32 Richie, Arrested Justice, 3. 
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rights of marginalized groups.”33 Richie further links current problems in the antiviolence 
movement to the historical marginalization of women of color. More specifically, she argues that 
the feminist antiviolence project can be characterized as a success only if one is socially 
privileged, complicit in “prison nation” ideologies, and inattentive to the way race, class, 
sexuality, and so forth change the experiences and needs of victims.34 To paraphrase Richie, 
some “strategic decisions” that mainstream feminists have traded on include support for 
mandatory arrest laws, prohibition of crisis center services to women with “felony backgrounds,” 
lack of concern for “lesbian battering,” and disregard for police or “state violence.”35 
Scholars often locate the failures of the antiviolence movement, in part, in liberal reform 
campaigns that undercut earlier grassroots or radical efforts.36 One recurring storyline goes as 
follows: “informal” and non-hierarchal shelters and crisis centers surrendered their independence 
to the state in the material need for resources, funding, and a more lasting stability and 
permanence.37 Or as Bevacqua observes, the more radical aspects of feminism are diminished in 
                                                            
33 Richie, Arrested Justice, 3. 
34 Ibid., 3-4. 
35 Ibid., 159-160.  
36 The division between radical and liberal strands of feminism in the mid-twentieth century has 
been a major theme in historicizing the second wave. Historian Alice Echols sums up the 
distinctions in liberal and radical feminist strategy and ideology as follows: “Whereas liberal 
feminism sought to include women in the mainstream, radical feminism embodied a rejection of 
the mainstream itself. And while liberal feminists defined the problem as women’s exclusion 
from the public sphere, radical feminists focused on the sexual politics of personal life.” Alice 
Echols, Daring to Be Bad: Radical Feminism in America, 1967-1975 (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 15. 
37 Bumiller, for example, describes shelters and rape crisis centers as “radical” and “grassroots” 
in origin and based on a “collective” structure and an explicit hostility to state intervention. But 
the growing need for resources and funding ultimately lead grassroots antiviolence activists to 
utilize state services in addition to legal and legislative reform tactics. Similarly, historian Anne 
Enke describes how early efforts of second-wave feminists included the establishment of 
shelters, clinics, and rape crisis centers, which often sprung up in women’s basements and were 
rooted in locally-based, “informal” political networks. Enke writes of the trajectory of these early 
feminist institutions: “All of them involved compromise: feminists left a deep and lasting imprint 
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the mainstream process of translating feminist ideals into a public policy.38 But the distinction 
between grassroots and reformist feminism is fragile at best—belying the fact that they most 
often worked in tandem. This is by no means a new argument in the broader context of feminist 
historical literature. Local studies of second-wave feminism often emphasize that any clear 
distinctions between radical and liberal factions broke down in on-the-ground efforts. For 
instance, in her monograph on activism in Washington, D.C., Anne Valk writes of the regional 
dynamics between the two camps:  
Although feminists used such categories to describe their approaches, their grassroots 
activities revealed frequent variations, compromises, and adaptions, suggesting that 
liberal and radical feminism often overlapped and transmuted to adapt to specific 
demands.39  
 
Indeed, even when at odds, oppositional political positions within the movement often facilitated 
mainstream public acceptance: the militancy of radical feminists allowed the liberal feminist line 
to appear less extreme.40 Stephanie Gilmore’s Groundswell makes a similar point about the role 
of the National Organization for Women (NOW), often considered a stand-in for liberal 
feminism, in Ohio, Tennessee, and San Francisco, CA. In contrast to its chapters in major urban 
centers, NOW chapters in suburban cities were often one of the only spaces in which more 
radically-minded feminists could gather and discuss strategies.41 
Hesford remarks that one of the problems in understanding U.S. feminism’s complexity 
is the way the movement is often framed in historical writings. She describes, for instance, how 
several writers and activists “tended to tell the same story;” in particular, through describing the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
on mainstream institutions, but many felt that the process scarred the very soul of the movement” 
(21). See Bumiller, In an Abusive State; 2-5; Enke, Finding the Movement, 177-216. 
38 Bevacqua, Rape on the Public Agenda, 132-136. 
39 Valk, Radical Sisters, 4.  
40 Ibid., 8.  
41 Stephanie Gilmore, Groundswell: Grassroots Feminist Activism in Postwar America (New 
York: Routledge, 2012), 1-20. 
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feminist movement’s initial success and subsequent failures by tracing a narrative arc that moves 
“from simplicity to complexity.”42 Hesford links this trend to the very conventions of storytelling 
itself, or the desire to offer up a chronological narrative, in addition to traditional revisionist 
motives for claiming legitimacy.43 Her critique signals a problem in understanding the feminist 
movement’s precise relationship with the neoliberal state: is feminism directly complicit with or 
appropriated by state interests? Specifically, neither Bumiller nor Bevacqua, for instance, denies 
that reformist and radical feminists often worked together in daily politics. In fact, Bevacqua 
implicitly describes this dynamic of mutuality in her history of the anti-rape movement.44 But in 
telling a story of feminist origins, both also frame radical ideology as distinct from liberal 
feminism. This, in turn, blurs the specific role that popular radical feminist theories of rape had 
in bolstering the state’s agenda—by framing their earlier efforts in securing non-state crisis 
centers as qualitatively less flawed. The overall effect is to downplay the precise ways both 
radical and liberal strands have worked concurrently to generate feminist reform ‘progress.’ 
I want to point out that focusing on only radical and liberal feminism is in itself 
problematic as a subject. Becky Thompson, for instance, has argued that the recurrent historical 
focus on tensions between the three ‘main’ strands of feminism (radical, liberal, and socialist) 
                                                            
42 Hesford, Feeling Women’s Liberation, 7. 
43 Ibid., 6-14. Hesford builds on a tradition of influential scholarship, including Joan Scott’s 
essays on gender and history and Ann Laura Stoler’s theories of the colonial archive.  
44 Bevacqua, Rape on the Public Agenda, 18-65. In her narrative of origins, Bevacqua 
emphasizes the distinction between radical and liberal feminists, decidedly crediting the former 
with generating early interest in rape as a subject of interest around 1970. She further describes 
the membership-based National Organization for Women (NOW) as belatedly interested in anti-
rape organizing and, overall, casts liberal feminism as supplemental to the radical sect’s 
grassroots efforts. But in tracking the larger arc of her evidence, she writes of their merging 
point: “Both the formal organizations of the women’s rights branch and the small, grassroots 
groups of the radical branch of the second wave of the women’s movement created a 
communications network for anti-rape activists just as they provided an organizational base on 
which the movement drew” (42). 
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elides the formative roles and intellectual production of women of color’s feminist work during 
the second-wave period.45 But my intention here is not the erasure of diverse “feminisms,” but 
rather, just the opposite.46 My interest in the disagreement over self-defense politics—via liberal 
and radical tactical debates—for the Garcia campaign hinges on complicating the recurrent claim 
that radical feminist politics has played a lesser role in the historical merging of feminist and 
conservative politics. By mapping out the points by which liberal and radical feminists worked in 
partnership, I hope to show how this dynamic often becomes obscured in the process of politics. 
In holding too tightly to the feminist progress narrative (Hesford’s point), scholars often subtly 
portray early radical feminist projects as less problematic even as they are critical of them. This 
ultimately obscures the myriad problems in radical feminist patriarchal ideology.47 
This background points to the crux of my analysis of the trial at hand. In the campaign for 
Inez Garcia, the façade of radical and liberal opposition masked how grassroots activists 
embraced a strictly feminist legal self-defense as they simultaneously called for anti-state tactics. 
                                                            
45 Becky Thompson, “Multiracial Feminism: Recasting the Chronology of Second Wave 
Feminism,” in No More Permanent Waves: Recasting Histories of U.S. Feminism, ed. Nancy 
Hewitt (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2010), 39-60.  
46 Sociologist Benita Roth, who focuses on Black, Chicana, and white “feminisms,” uses the 
plural term to reject common depictions of feminism as the project of only white and middle-
class women, or a false “whitewashed vision of second-wave feminist protest” (10). Benita Roth, 
Separate Roads to Feminism: Black, Chicana, and White Feminist Movements in America’s 
Second Wave (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
47 In a contemporary essay on the exclusivity of domestic violence shelters today, Emi Koyama 
describes the effects of early feminist decisions: “By focusing excessively on ‘the power of 
shared experiences among women,’ these radical feminists created a movement that discourages 
and suppresses the discussions about the specificities of each woman’s experiences within a 
complex matrix of social inequalities….” (216). For Koyama, the only way to “repoliticize” 
feminist antiviolence work is to explicitly center these myriad differences among women—
differences that reveal violence against women is not only interpersonal, but deeply embedded in 
our political and institutional structures. Emi Koyama, “Disloyal to Feminism: Abuse of 
Survivors within the Domestic Violence Shelter System,” in Color of Violence: the Incite! 
Anthology, eds. INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 
2006), 216. 
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Thus, even though activists might have rejected working within traditional institutional 
channels—what the Free Inez Garcia Committee dubbed “the Man’s legal system”—they often 
did just that.48 More to the point, though feminists described a diverse range of approaches to 
self-defense in writings on the trial, such as the suggestion to organize local women’s groups for 
protection or the need for women’s martial arts classes, Garcia’s victory is only evidence of a 
legal version of self-defense.49 Further, what enabled such widespread support of Garcia was, in 
part, the flawed epistemic premise of female essentialism and timeless patriarchy. In positioning 
Garcia as an example to all women, many feminists actively obscured the specific ways 
differential social locations refract experiences of violence. This resulted in an overextended 
symbolic deployment of Garcia as universally representative. In turn, certain facts about her 
legal victory have received less attention: that this was at base a murder trial (no rapist was ever 
charged) or that the media often portrayed her in terms antithetical to the feminist campaign.50 
Though she had widespread support from various movements and organizations—including the 
Black Panther Party and the United Farm Workers of America—an analysis of the broader 
dimensions of her case illustrate that more mainstream institutions often subverted the feminist 
message.  
Finally, I want to state that the activist campaign that ensued on Garcia’s behalf gestures 
at many of the unresolved paradoxes that linger for feminist anti-rape politics. In this way, the 
                                                            
48 “Inez Garcia: Womanpride Fighting Back,” pamphlet by the Free Inez Garcia Committee, 
1975. Special Collections, University of Michigan Library.  
49 The subject of self-defense as a viable tactic for feminism continues in contemporary debates. 
At issue is whether preemptive strategies such as martial arts training are collectively-based or 
individualizing, in which the latter scenario is construed as placing the burden of rape on 
individual women. For a positive appraisal of self-defense, see Ann Cahill, “In Defense of Self-
Defense,” Philosophical Papers 38, vol. 3 (2009), 363-380. For criticism, see Carine M. 
Mardorossian, “Toward a New Feminist Theory of Rape,” Signs 27, no. 3 (2002): 743-775. 
50 This first point is made by Maria Bevacqua: no rapists were charged in either Joan Little’s or 
Inez Garcia’s case. See Bevacqua, Rape on the Public Agenda, 129.  
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trial of Inez Garcia is neither a simple success nor a total failure for second-wave feminists. On 
an individual level, Garcia won a legal battle. Yet this is not the framework for my critique. In 
1977, her acquittal was widely considered a victory not only by liberal feminists but by diverse 
bands of activists. And yet the precise meaning of her actions—as justifiable self-defense or 
vigilante justice—was a major point of contention both within the feminist movement and 
beyond it. The trial, then, was not only about broad-based solidarity or a collective model of 
feminist self-defense—two themes that continue to shape its historical legacy. The support that 
Garcia elicited illustrates that deeply conflicting ideas about feminist identity and antiviolence 
politics coexisted at the outset. 
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Chapter 1: A Feminist Cause: The Trials of Inez Garcia, 1974-1977 
On March 19, 1974, a 30-year-old woman named Inez Garcia was preparing dinner at the 
two-bedroom apartment she had recently rented in Soledad, CA. With her 11-year-old son 
Johnny, Garcia had moved from Miami, FL to Soledad three year earlier to be near her husband 
Juan, an anti-Castro activist who was serving time in the prison there for his involvement with a 
political bombing in Los Angeles. Garcia, who was raised in New York City’s Spanish Harlem 
by her Cuban and Puerto Rican family, was supporting herself and her son by working in the 
local farm industry where she was alternately a day laborer in the fields and a caretaker for the 
other workers’ children.51  
Around 8 p.m. two local men named Luis Castillo and Miguel Jiminez arrived at her 
Soledad residence. Both men were heavily intoxicated and looking for Garcia’s roommate, Fred 
Medrano, a Vietnam War veteran who planned to move to Texas with his fiancé once Garcia 
finished moving in.52 When Medrano returned, Castillo and Jiminez physically assaulted him and 
then left the building. What happened next is a matter of debate. According to Garcia, she went 
outside after the scuffle to make sure the men had left the property wherein she was shoved 
behind the house, restrained by Jiminez, and raped by Castillo. Garcia went back inside, received 
a threatening phone call from Jiminez, and loaded a .22-caliber hunting rifle. Deeply shocked 
and distressed, Garcia then called her extended family in Miami to tell them of her assault. 
Approximately twenty minutes later, Garcia left the house to confront Castillo and Jiminez. She 
found both men a few blocks away, where they were again attacking Medrano. When Jiminez 
                                                            
51 Wood, The Rape of Inez Garcia, 12; “Viva Inez!” Monograph by Inez Garcia Defense 
Committee, 1974. Special Collections. Shields Library, University of California-Davis. 
52 Ibid.  
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brandished his knife, she shot her rifle six times. Her gunfire fatally wounded Jiminez while 
Castillo escaped and took shelter in a nearby park until police arrived.53  
Garcia was taken to the Soledad police station that night for questioning where she 
immediately confessed to killing Jiminez. Both she and Medrano were arrested and soon after 
indicted by a grand jury on charges of first-degree murder.54 In the meantime, Garcia’s affluent 
Miami relatives secured for her defense the legal counsel of Charles Garry, the famous San 
Francisco-based attorney long associated with leftist causes, most notably for his work defending 
Huey Newton and other members of the Black Panther Party.55 Three months later, Garcia was 
released on $5,000 bail. Garry initially considered the case “a straightforward matter.”56 But as 
he learned more details, two key elements challenged his preliminary assessment and posed 
specific legal obstacles to his defense strategy. First, the lapse of time (at least twenty minutes) 
between the sexual assault and the homicide made Garcia vulnerable to allegations of 
“premeditated murder;” that during the gap she had “formed the specific intent to kill Jiminez.”57 
Second, there was no police record of Garcia’s rape, leaving her without any proof of the assault 
or concrete evidence of her motive. Soledad police claimed that Garcia never reported the rape, 
while Garcia stated that she attempted to tell them but found it impossible to express the details 
given their dismissive attitude.58 
Garry recognized that the trouble Garcia encountered in trying to report the rape would 
resonate with women’s rights advocates and he arranged for Garcia to meet with local feminists 
                                                            
53 Wood, The Rape of Inez Garcia, 12, 98; “Viva Inez!” Monograph by Inez Garcia Defense 
Committee, 1974. Special Collections. Shields Library, University of California-Davis. 
54 Wood, The Rape of Inez Garcia, 27; see also Charles Garry and Art Goldberg, Streetfighter in 
the Courtroom: The People’s Advocate (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1977), 218-219. 
55 Wood, The Rape of Inez Garcia, 28-29. 
56 Garry and Goldberg, Streetfighter in the Courtroom, 217. 
57 Ibid., 218. 
58 Ibid. 
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to relay her story.59 Anti-rape organizing was a primary concern for the women’s movement in 
the mid-1970s, and her plight elicited the devoted support of a cohort of West Coast feminists 
(many from Berkeley and San Francisco) who called themselves the Inez Garcia Defense 
Committee. The group raised funds, distributed informational materials, held press conferences, 
organized daily transportation of activists, and even rented a house near the Monterey courthouse 
to shelter Garcia and her supporters for the duration of her legal battle.60 To national papers like 
the New York Times, Garry announced that underpinning his defense strategy was the “unwritten 
law,” or “‘the right of a woman who has been raped to take the law into her own hands to protect 
her integrity.”61 And in the months leading up to the trial, the Defense Committee vigorously 
promoted Garcia as a courageous symbol of a woman’s right to self-defense and a revealing 
example of the institutional and societal disregard of rape victims everywhere. The New York 
Times reported on their efforts: “Rallies have been held in Mrs. Garcia’s honor, leaflets 
distributed and articles written in underground newspapers, all picturing the beautiful woman as 
heroine because she went to such violent and unusual lengths to seek retribution.”62 By late 
summer, the Defense Committee had succeeded in capturing local, national, and international 
attention from fellow activists and mainstream media alike.  
The trial of Garcia and codefendant Medrano, both charged with first-degree murder for 
the shooting of Jiminez, began at the Monterey County Superior Court in Salinas, CA in August 
1974. While Garry had touted the righteousness of the “unwritten law” defense to press, his legal 
                                                            
59 Garry and Goldberg, Streetfighter in the Courtroom, 221. 
60 Wood’s book documents the Inez Garcia Defense Committee’s campaign in detail.  
61 Lacey Fosburgh, “Assertion of Rape and ‘Unwritten Law’ Form a Coast Woman’s Murder 
Defense,” New York Times, August 31, 1974, 32. ProQuest Historical Newspapers (119967232).  
62 Ibid. 
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strategy in the courtroom relied instead on an “impaired consciousness” line of argument.”63 
Conversely, the prosecution, argued by District Attorney Arthur Baudrick, maintained there was 
no evidence that Garcia was raped, stressed the case was a “simple murder charge,” and asserted 
that Garcia and Medrano had planned to kill Jiminez to settle a dispute over local drug sales.64 
Central to Baudrick’s case was his contention that Garcia used the rape allegation to deflect 
attention away from the murder.65 Yet most problematic for the defense was that presiding Judge 
Stanley Lawson insisted that because there was no legal proof of rape, it was therefore irrelevant 
to the trial. During Garry’s opening remarks, Lawson interjected: “Counsel, I cannot permit this. 
We are trying a woman for murder. There is no man on trial for rape, and the attitude of the 
police for rape or murder, as far as I am concerned, has nothing to do with the guilt or innocence 
of this woman.”66 
 Over the next few weeks, both sides attempted to piece together their version of the 
events of March 19 with disputed details and conflicting testimonies. To the anger of Garcia’s 
supporters, Castillo took to the stand and testified that he did not rape her, even snickering when 
Garry posed the question to him during cross-examination.67 Another key witness for the 
prosecution was Cristofo Solis, a friend of Medrano’s, who had returned to the Soledad 
apartment with him that night. Solis testified that he witnessed Medrano stating his intention to 
kill Jiminez and heard Garcia offer to execute the murder since her extended family was well-off 
                                                            
63 Garry and Goldberg, Streetfighter in the Courtroom, 228-230; Wood, The Rape of Inez 
Garcia, 146. Many of Garcia’s supporters objected to Garry’s use of psychiatric testimony.  
64 Quoted phrase in Leroy F. Aarons, “Rape as Murder Defense: Woman Says She Killed in 
Frenzy After Attack,” Washington Post, September 22, 1974, A2. ProQuest Historical 
Newspapers (146131197). 
65 Garry and Goldberg, Streetfighter in the Courtroom, 224; Wood, The Rape of Inez Garcia, 76-
79.  
66 Garry and Goldberg, Streetfighter in the Courtroom, 223; Wood, The Rape of Inez Garcia, 84.  
67 Garry and Goldberg, Streetfighter in the Courtroom, 224-225; Wood, The Rape of Inez 
Garcia, 107.  
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and could easily arrange for her acquittal. Yet several points in Solis’s testimony proved 
inconsistent under further probing by Garry.68 Further, the prosecution could make no connection 
between Garcia and drug use or sales, begging the question of her motive, or why Garcia would 
offer to handle the killing for a mere acquaintance.69 
Baudrick also called to the stand three of Garcia’s friends—Alicia Alcarez, Rosa 
Bracamonte, and Juan Carbajal—whom she met up with immediately after the shooting. Alcarez 
confirmed that when Garcia first arrived at Bracamonte’s house, she stated that her motive for 
killing Jiminez was that the two men either raped or had tried to rape her, though she could not 
recall the precise wording that Garcia used. Moreover, she maintained that though Garcia’s 
blouse was slightly torn, the group suggested that she did not look messy enough for the police to 
believe her allegations of rape. Thus, Alcarez ripped Garcia’s shirt to make the tear more 
pronounced and then directed her nephew, Juan Carbajal, to hit Garcia’s face several times as 
visible proof of attack. Finally, two neighborhood youths testified to witnessing the shooting 
from their front porch. Both asserted that Garcia had been driven to the scene—contradicting 
Garcia’s testimony that she had walked the five blocks to the scene alone. However, their view 
was partially obstructed so they lacked concrete details.70 
Most critical to the defense’s case was the testimony of Dr. Jane Oldden, an expert 
witness who met with Garcia three times before the trial to evaluate her mental health. Oldden 
stressed that Garcia was neither sociopathic nor insane and asserted that Garcia exhibited the 
                                                            
68 Garry and Goldberg, Streetfighter in the Courtroom, 225-226; Wood, The Rape of Inez 
Garcia, 110-116.  
69 Garry writes of his defense strategy: “…if there was no rape the whole thing made no sense. 
Medrano was not that badly hurt and though Garcia, too, had been beaten, this was not sufficient 
cause to send her out to kill two young men. It had to be the emotional trauma of rape that 
provided the impetus for the killing.” See Garry, Streetfighter in the Courtroom, 229.  
70 Garry and Goldberg, Streetfighter in the Courtroom, 227-228; Wood, The Rape of Inez 
Garcia; 122-130.  
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symptoms of rape trauma—severe weight loss, broken sleep, guilty feelings, and only partial 
memory of the incident.71 In the aftermath of the rape, Garcia acted in “…‘a deeply dissociated 
state of altered or impaired consciousness.’”72  Oldden further stated: “‘Only something as 
extreme as rape would provoke her to violent retribution.’”73 Considering Garcia’s strong Roman 
Catholic faith, Garry also arranged for Father Eugene Boyle to testify on the Church’s 
conventional stance on rape. Boyle explained that Garcia’s actions were not only understandable 
but also admirable given the premium Roman Catholic doctrine places on marital fidelity.74 
On October 4, 1974, the jury of seven women and five men found Garcia guilty of 
second-degree murder after almost three days of deliberation. They failed to reach a verdict for 
Medrano, who was released on grounds of a mistrial.75 A few weeks later, on October 21, Judge 
Lawson handed down the maximum sentence of 5-years-to-life. Garcia remained composed 
throughout the hearing, but her supporters were outraged as more than one hundred activists 
inside and outside the Monterey courthouse chanted slogans like “Free Inez!” and “Fight rape!” 
further strengthening their commitment to her release.76 Lawson again emphasized his opinion 
that rape was not at issue in the Garcia case. A reporter for the Chicago Tribune described the 
scene: “Directing his remarks to the gallery of Garcia supporters, the 68-year-old judge said:  
                                                            
71 Garry and Goldberg, Streetfighter in the Courtroom, 229; Wood, The Rape of Inez Garcia, 
142-143. 
72 Garry and Goldberg, Streetfighter in the Courtroom, 229. 
73 Wood, The Rape of Inez Garcia, 146. 
74 Garry and Goldberg, Streetfighter in the Courtroom, 231; Wood, The Rape of Inez Garcia, 
153-157. 
75 Associated Press, “Alleged Rape Victim Convicted for Murder,” Los Angeles Times, October 
5, 1974, C16. ProQuest Historical Newspapers (157588523). 
76 Associated Press, “Calif. woman gets 5 years-life for slaying the alleged rapist,” Boston Globe, 
October 22, 1974, 2. ProQuest Historical Newspapers (822106054); “Did Inez Garcia Have a 
Right to Kill? A Jury Says No,” People Magazine, October 21, 1974, 
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‘This was not a rape trial—it was a murder trial….Whether Inez Garcia was raped is 
problematical….There’s a question of whether a woman has the right to execute a man 
who raped her. Where do you draw the line?...Thank the Lord we have a government of 
laws. You are urging a government of men.’77  
 
Further, as another writer for The London Observer reported, Lawson also directly dismissed 
Garry’s impaired consciousness defense: “He said after the assault on her, Mrs. Garcia had found 
time to make two telephone calls, pick up a friend as driver and load a rifle before ‘going off on 
the prowl like a huntress.’”78 
Many Garcia supporters were outraged by Judge Lawson’s comments—one cluster of 
activists even organized a protest in front of his house with the purposefully provocative chant: 
“‘Free Inez Garcia! Rape the judge and see what he does!’”79 But dissatisfaction with the ruling 
went beyond her base of local California advocates as a flurry of statements from feminist 
organizations across the U.S. condemned the ruling. One activist from the Feminist Women’s 
Health Center in California described to the press the scope of feminist actions targeting the 
injustice of Garcia’s conviction:  
‘Thousands of women are expected to strike Monday and attend the demonstration across 
the country. They will protest Mrs. Garcia’s conviction and affirm women’s rights. There 
will be protests in the San Francisco Bay Area, one in Detroit, one in Iowa City, and later 
on, one in Chicago. Groups of women will march on the United States embassies in 
London and Paris.’80  
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While a representative from the national group, Women Against Rape (WAR), proclaimed, in a 
pithy statement indicative of generalized feminist sentiment: “‘We call for Inez Garcia’s 
acquittal on grounds of self-defense.’”81   
As Garcia served her sentence at the California Institute for Women, anti-rape activists 
continued to highlight the broader issues that her case signaled: the victim-blaming practices of 
police, courts and media and the necessity of a legal precedent for women’s right to self-defense. 
But activists did not lose sight of the specific case at hand. In the weeks following her 
conviction, a second local activist group formed in San Francisco, CA, aptly named the Free Inez 
Garcia Committee (FIGC), to bolster the original Defense Committee’s efforts in raising money 
and focusing attention on Garcia’s appeal.82 Several mainstream membership-based 
organizations also worked to unite diverse social movement activists around her cause—shifting 
the focus away from gender alone to the racial, ethnic, and cultural dimensions that complicate 
experiences of sexual violence. One particularly significant “coalition” that reflected this broad-
based collaboration included the Women’s Legal Defense Fund, the National Black Feminist 
Organization, the D.C. Rape Crisis Center, the Feminist Alliance Against Rape, and the 
Washington, D.C. chapters of the National Organization for Women, the National Conference of 
Puerto Rican Women, and the League of United Latin-American Citizens.83 
By the summer of 1975, mainstream press interest in Garcia’s case dulled as the focus 
shifted to the unfolding trial of Joan Little. Some outlets blamed feminists outright for interfering 
with Garcia’s trial by manipulating her image for their own ends and instructing her to appear 
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unapologetic so as to fit with their narrative of a woman’s uncompromising right to protect 
herself. Others pegged Garcia’s trial as a “poor test case” for the anti-rape movement due to the 
to the “time lapse” between the alleged rape and the shooting and for her “uncouth behavior in 
court.”84 In the meantime, amidst clashes with Garry over his impaired consciousness defense—
for casting Garcia’s actions as irrational and thus capitalizing on the longstanding duality of 
female anger as pathological and male anger as normal—groups like the FIGC called for a more 
explicitly “feminist defense” that relied on the “just provocation” of her actions if her appeal was 
granted. They soon arranged for Susan Jordan, a young lawyer from San Francisco who was later 
associated with the legal group known as the Women’s Self-Defense Law Project, to take over as 
Garcia’s attorney.85  
On December 29, 1975, the California Court of Appeals reversed Garcia’s conviction of 
second-degree murder, ruling that Judge Lawson “had erred when instructing the jury on 
reasonable doubt.”86 Garcia was released on $5,000 bail pending retrial.87 Jordan candidly 
announced to reporters that she intended to argue that Garcia had acted in “legitimate self-
defense.”88 In a confident tone, she further emphasized the paramount role that feminists played 
in changing the dominant social ideas and institutions about gender and rape that plagued 
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Garcia’s first trial: “‘The world has changed since 1974 in the area of rape, and the world and the 
laws have changed to a large extent because of actions like Inez’s, her defense and her trial and 
the work that the women’s community has done.’”89 Testimony for the retrial, presided over by 
Monterey County Superior Judge Nat A. Agliano, began on February 14, 1977 at the same 
Salinas courthouse.90 In contrast to Garry’s approach, Jordan’s defense relied, at core, on 
outlining the rationality of Garcia’s motive in shooting Jiminez: when he called her and verbally 
threatened further harm, Garcia perceived herself to be in imminent danger. Her perception of 
danger was further heightened when Jimenez waved his knife at Garcia when she confronted him 
on Monterey Street. Thus, the time lag between the rape and the homicide—the troubling detail 
that prompted charges of premeditated murder in the 1974 trial—could now be accounted for in 
legal terms through the logic of self-defense. Also notable in Jordan’s defense strategy was her 
commitment to undermining gender-based legal discrimination and cultural myths about rape. 
For instance, under voir dire, she probed potential jurors for their own prejudices about gender 
and rape—selecting only those who recognized their misconceptions. She later explained the 
significance of this line of questioning: “And the lights started to go off, because it was so clear 
that some jurors had one standard for the bad girls who got raped, and another standard for their 
daughters. They really began to engage in the dialogue.”91 
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District Attorney Baudrick once again led the prosecution, adhering to the same approach 
he used in Garcia’s first trial: that her motive for murder was drug-related. Though, he still failed 
to connect Garcia to any concrete incident of drug use or to a relationship with Medrano beyond 
casual acquaintance.92 Moreover, Castillo pleaded his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination and never testified in the retrial as to the events of March 19, 1974.93 Jordan, on 
the other hand, introduced a series of new witnesses who provided additional context for the lack 
of evidence that Garcia was raped. For instance, Arthur Gibbons, a Salinas police detective, 
described how rape victims have no typical response to rape when reporting and offered the 
opinion that the Soledad police should have further investigated Garcia’s original statement. 
Jordan also called to the stand Dr. Dolores Jiminez, a San Francisco-based clinical psychologist, 
who described Garcia’s initial response to the rape—in calling her relatives in Miami—as 
consonant with the traditional Latino cultural view that rape also represents an attack on the 
victim’s family honor. Such background also accounts for the deep shame Garcia felt when she 
first tried to report the sexual assault.94 
On March 4, 1977, Inez Garcia was acquitted of second-degree murder by the jury of ten 
men and two women.95 To the myriad activists who remained focused on her cause, the ruling 
signaled a major achievement for the anti-rape movement. The Los Angeles Times described the 
scene through the highly charged emotional reactions of her dedicated advocates: “The Monterey 
County courtroom, packed with about 75 partisan supporters of the defendant, exploded into a 
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cheer when the verdict was read. Several women burst into tears.”96 Similarly, another 
newspaper reported that “support seemed little diminished from its early intensity when Garcia 
was first tried and convicted.”97 Susan Jordan expressed to the press her hope that this new 
outcome would set a legal precedent for other women who injure or kill in self-defense.98 While 
the ICI: A Woman’s Place bookstore collective in Oakland, CA, “closed its doors in celebration 
of Inez Garcia’s victory” for the first time in over a decade since its founding.99 Later that month, 
on March 8, around two hundred of Garcia’s supporters marched in her honor at International 
Women’s Day festivities in Berkeley, CA.100  And in the weeks following the acquittal, feminists 
at the national level continually endorsed Garcia as a testament to the anti-rape movement’s 
tangible progress. For instance, Del Martin, a NOW member and delegate for the San Francisco 
Commission on Women, proclaimed: “I think there is a changing attitude about rape….The age 
old advice of ‘relax and enjoy it’ is no longer viable. What’s happening now is that women are 
finding strength in other women.’”101 For Martin, Garcia’s legal victory signaled a more general 
shift in social attitudes about rape and, further, a shift that testified, in large part, to women’s 
solidarity that feminism offered. 
At first glance, the simple fact that Inez Garcia was acquitted in her 1977 retrial attests to 
the accuracy of claiming the case as a feminist success story. In addition, it was Susan Jordan’s 
distinctly feminist legal defense—in contrast to Garry’s use of a more “irrational” line of 
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argument—that secured the victory. But these successes belie the more paradoxical meanings of 
her case. The imagery of Garcia as “the rape victim who fought back” pervades activist dialogue 
at the time. But her acquittal is less an argument in favor of a uniformly feminist self-defense, 
than for a lens through which to probe the deeply paradoxical range of ways feminists articulated 
politics in her name. More importantly, close examination of dissent over the meaning of 
Garcia’s actions opens up her trial to a broader consideration of the legacy of second-wave 
feminism. Thinking through the schisms between the figurative deployment of Garcia and the 
facts of her trial illustrate why the campaign for Garcia does not fit narrowly into the feminist 
storyline of success touted in the aftermath of her acquittal. As one Garcia supporter phrased it, 
“‘It’s important that women see it as a model for action…It is possible to fight back and it is 
your right to fight back.’”102 But precisely how did Garcia represent a “model for action”? Close 
examination of the feminist terms of what constituted ‘fighting back’ is nothing if not 
contradictory.  
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Chapter 2: Paradoxes of Second-Wave Feminist Politics 
Many scholars have argued that feminist self-defense emerged in reaction to a growing 
conservatism in the 1970s.103 On the one hand, the framing of Garcia as a “brave sister” marks a 
distinct contrast to popular media and filmic representations of sexual violence during the 
decade.104 For instance, Marilynn Johnson describes how press outlets seized on the lurid details 
of murder cases featuring (only white and middle-class) female victims like Kitty Genovese and 
“the Career Girl Murders” of Janice Wylie and Emily Hoffert as part of a larger fear-baiting 
scheme to blame women for the increase in “urban crime.”105 Historian Georgina Hickey argues 
that feminist calls for self-defense training emerged in part as a reaction to “conservative” 
approaches in U.S. advice literature for women in the 1960s and 1970s.106 Self-defense in these 
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concludes that the overall effect of this false image of interracial crime was the hindering of both 
gender and racial justice campaigns by encouraging suburban white flight and conservative 
policy reforms (257).  
106 Georgina Hickey, “From Civility to Self-Defense,” WSQ: Women’s Studies Quarterly 39, no. 
1 and 2 (2011): 77-94. Hickey tracks a critical transition in the tone and content of “etiquette 
manuals and advice books” aimed at women’s behavior in public throughout the twentieth 
century (79). Her larger point is that earlier guides, based on manners, are qualitatively more 
liberating for women given the “conservative” articulations of self-defense. She writes, “Counter 
to the common assumption that women’s freedoms have only steadily increased over the course 
of the century, the earlier assumptions of civility may have actually allowed more room for 
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popular “manuals” was defined not as physical resistance, but rather through tactics of avoidance 
and the cultivation of “paranoia” as the most effective strategies for safety.107 Hickey describes 
the advice as part of a punitive push-back on feminist upheaval: “Telling women to be wary, to 
stay at home, to never be alone, and to obey their fears certainly encouraged them to internalize 
the backlash and believe that the opportunities opened by second-wave feminism actually put 
women at great physical risk.”108 Thus, as an antidote to the dominant cultural and visual literacy 
of the 1970s, the widespread feminist embrace of Garcia’s actions as radical makes sense. 
But the context of conservative reaction does not exhaust the reasons feminists engaged 
with the issue of self-defense. In her 1981 essay “Rethinking the Seventies: Women Writers and 
Violence,” feminist critic Elaine Showalter argues for an additional catalyst: a feminist interest in 
violence that was both real and imagined.109 She writes of the literary trends to mark the decade:  
Women’s novels are testing the limits of the liberated will and the metaphysics of 
violence. What are the irrational forces of evil and violence that collide with one’s life? 
Are they outside the self, in male society? Or are they also within the self, in fantasy, 
guilt, and hate? The phantom killer is obviously a monitory figure; he may also be a 
projection of female violence, the extreme form of an anger woman have only recently 
begun to imagine and explore. Although its fictional forms are more disturbing than we 
might have predicted, violence as a fantasy was an undercurrent of feminist thought 
during the decade.110 
 
For Showalter, cultural saturation in depictions of both violent and violated women in the 
1970s—in popular novels like Judith Rossner’s 1975 novel Looking for Mr. Goodbar—reflected 
women’s varied explorations of violence as much as conservative counterattacks.111 Neal King 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
women to act, and act without fair of negative physical or social repercussions, in public space” 
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and Martha McCaughey touch upon a similar sentiment in their assessment of the central 
paradox in rape-revenge movies: “Most feminists oppose violence, define it as patriarchal and 
oppressive, yet often enjoy scenes in which female characters defend themselves, save the day, 
seek revenge, and get away with it in the end.”112 This disconnect between reality and fantasy, 
between standing against violence and taking it up as a revolutionary cause, is an important 
context for mapping out the points of contention for feminist articulations of self-defense. In the 
following critique, I show how the slippage between fantasies of retaliation and extralegal 
revenge tactics underscore why many second-wave feminists disagreed on the precise terms of 
self-defense politics.   
For the Inez Garcia Defense Committee, the construction of Garcia’s symbolic value was 
crucial to their ability to attract attention beyond the local scene. That Garcia’s case, in 
particular, was taken up is in part due to external factors, such as the celebrity status of her first 
lawyer Charles Garry, the regional proximity to cities like San Francisco (as historian Stephanie 
Gilmore dubs it “a hotbed of radical activism”), and a general press interest in the women’s 
movement in the 1970s.113 But it was local supporters who first publicized Garcia. At a pretrial 
press conference, held at the U.S. Customs House in San Francisco, CA, Defense Committee 
members distributed to reporters an information sheet titled “Viva Inez” which states their reason 
for promoting her.114 After a brief summary of the details in both English and Spanish, the paper 
reads: 
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For defending herself against brutal and senseless attack, Inez Garcia is accused of 
premeditated murder. Her attacker is free. Thousands upon thousands of women have 
been attacked and raped and countless more live in fear of rape. Inez is one of the few to 
defend herself so bravely. Her case is an example to everyone, for until men stop 
attacking women, women must be free to defend themselves by whatever means 
necessary.115  
 
The statement illustrates key points in the original construction of Garcia as a movement icon. 
First, they claim that Garcia has universal appeal; in other words, that she is exemplary to all 
women. Second, that Garcia represents a subversive figure—as a disruption in the conventional 
depiction of rape victims as passive, vengeful, willing, or provocative.  
Many second-wave feminists saw Garcia’s actions as a distinct form of political violence. 
This view parallels radical feminist theories of rape as a patriarchal tool characteristic of the 
period. In her 1975 bestseller Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape, Susan Brownmiller 
famously defines rape as “nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by 
which all men keep all women in a state of fear.”116 Brownmiller’s definition of rape as an act of 
male violence is premised on two claims. Rape occurs because of the biological difference in 
male and female genitalia; that “the human male was a natural predator and the human female 
served as his natural prey.”117 And, further, that few women fight back against assailants because 
they are “trained to be rape victims” by adhering to feminine social scripts.118 In other words, 
popular feminist theories like Brownmiller’s rely on a neat distinction between sex (as 
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biological) and gender (as social construction). Such theories are also made in the name of all 
women and all men—what many scholars have termed feminist essentialism.  
This was the basic theoretical premise that underpinned much early activist embrace of 
Garcia’s cause. For instance, after the 1974 conviction, one supporter remarked, “Within 
patriarchal society, women who ‘take the law into their own hands’ are defying their assigned 
role of passivity, and to break from an established role is a political act.”119 Yet not only did 
feminists advocate rejection of traditional feminine behavior, they also sought to undermine 
widespread cultural stigmatization of women’s anger as unhealthy and abnormal. As I noted 
earlier, many feminists vehemently rejected Charles Garry’s defense strategy in her first trial for 
this very reason: “impaired consciousness” implied that Garcia shot Jimenez in a state of 
psychological disassociation. Writing about the trial in 1974 for the radical feminist magazine off 
our backs, Madeleine Janover explains:  
The only way Inez could have been acquitted then, was to manipulate the jury into seeing 
that she is just another emotionally disturbed female. But Inez stated quite clearly that she 
knew exactly what she was doing and that to defend her dignity, she would do it again. When 
they realized that they could not pass the political off as insane, they locked her away.120  
 
Likewise, the Free Inez Garcia Committee touched on precisely the same theme: “Any of us who 
acts [sic] as though we are free, as though we have self-determination, dignity, and the skills to 
defend ourselves, is labeled unhealthy, hysterical, and unlawful.”121 A radical feminist politics of 
self-defense, then, relied on both the denunciation of conventional femininity evidenced, for 
instance, in the campaign mantra “fight back,” and on the simultaneous recuperation of female 
strength as heroic, righteous, and sane.   
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In this vein, Garcia offered compelling material for artistic and creative meditations on the 
injustices of sexual violence and the need for alterative imagery. For instance, in a poem titled 
“For Inez Garcia,” Chicana feminist writer Marge Piercy deploys Garcia as a symbol of the 
collective power of feminist identity.122 The subject of the poem is a broader exploration of the 
meaning of female agency in a sexist society. As Piercy poses the question: 
What does it mean to say No? 
What does it mean to say No to superior force?123 
 
For Piercy, the “superior force” is patriarchy and, hence, “woman’s honor” is submerged in 
socialized gender roles, or how women are “trained to give way.”124 Her answer to the gendered 
power imbalance under patriarchy is evidenced in her linguist shift to the plural term ‘women’: 
Let Inez Garcia, Joan Little become  
two faces in a crowd of women, an army 
each defending her body, defending her sister,  
defending the frail ghost of the new whole 
conscious self struggling to stand upright 
and walk, like a year-old child.125 
 
Couched in the language of renewal and rebirth, Piercy calls up Garcia as a single node in a 
budding new identity: feminist collectivity. Piercy appeals to feminist identification as based not 
only in mutual support, but also active defense (as opposed to “the prone corpse of our 
passivity”).126 In another poem by Susan Grathwohl, Garcia is cited directly only once in the 
title, “In Defense of Inez Garcia.”127 The thematic crux of the poem is the devastating and 
ongoing trauma of rape against a backdrop of institutional incompetence. The narrator opens 
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with the profoundly unsettling image of rootlessness provoked by rape as her home is now a 
crime scene: 
You don’t go back to your place 
 for three days—the sperm 
stains on the velvet sofa 
soak in; black smudges around 
the light switches stick 
 to grease and sweat, incomplete 
whorls, no fingerprints.128  
 
With each line of verse, a pervasive sense of irrationality and anxiety builds in the narrator as 
police fail to make any progress in finding the rapist, consistently show insensitivity, and finally 
ineptitude. Details throughout illustrate that the narrator is not meant to be Garcia. The final 
stanza is thus most revealing for the titular reference:  
At the end of the month, 
they drop the case. 
You think you see the rapist on the subway. 
Day after day, down on the station, 
you wait in the dark mezzanine.129 
 
Without recourse to justice, the narrator remains in a state of limbo—“waiting”—as she is 
haunted each day by the memory of her rape. Garcia thus works here to juxtapose the narrator 
through the finitude of her actions (which, at the same time, represent an alternative to police 
inadequacy).  
Similarly, some rape survivors saw Garcia as a stand-in for their own fantasies of 
retaliation—recalling Showalter’s remarks on feminist interest in “violence as a fantasy.”130 For 
instance, Jim Wood remarks, of Garcia’s local base of activists, “The women also spent 
considerable time fantasizing about appropriate punishments for rapists. The proposals ranged 
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from the bizarre (stuffing a large fish up the rapist’s anus) to the traditional (castration, a 
punishment which, with the loss of eyes, dates back to William the Conqueror). Implicit in their 
violent images was the recognition that rape was itself an act of utmost violence.”131 In another 
example, in an interview with Susan Brownmiller, Susan Rothaizer, a founding member of the 
Defense Committee, describes the details of her own rape while hitchhiking as a college student 
in Massachusetts years earlier.132 Rothaizer never reported the rape, remained deeply 
“humiliated” by it, and often engaged in fantasies of exacting revenge on her two rapists. 
Rothaizer remarks of her decision to organize for Garcia’s acquittal: “‘It crystallized something 
for me…I could channel my rage in a positive way.’”133 For Rothaizer, Garcia’s trial represented 
a constructive and cathartic outlet by which to work through the traumatic aftermath of her own 
rape.134 Even more tellingly, Brownmiller reports: “Several of the core group of eight women on 
the Garcia defense committee had been raped.”135 
Yet the legitimate anger that Garcia’s narrative tapped into went beyond the discursive realm 
to a discussion of tactics. On the one hand, the constant shifting between figurative and literal 
self-defense follows again from the logic of rape as act of patriarchal warfare. For instance, the 
opening lines to the 1973 radical feminist position paper “Rape: The All American Crime” read:  
Rape is the perfect example of a woman’s experience in a sexist society, the ultimate act 
of aggression which binds the victim still closer to her oppressors. Rape is both a 
symbolic and an actual means of keeping a woman in her place: for every rape that does 
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take place there are thousands of possible rapes in the back of a woman’s mind every 
time she walks down the street. The controls exerted by this fear effectively limit the 
freedom of all women, and in fact encourage women to seek out men as protectors from 
other men.136  
 
In other words, because rape is dually “symbolic and actual,” all women live in fear which, in 
turn, forecloses female agency at a societal level. To dismantle rape in the context of feminist 
patriarchal theories, then, entails a multi-pronged campaign of both cultural and physical 
resistance.  
But the translation of self-defense to the strategic realm proved more divisive. For some, the 
revenge fantasies that fed Garcia’s symbolic power took literal form. In her memoir A Simple 
Revolution, poet Judy Grahn recounts an incident of failed retaliation on a local rapist.137 Grahn 
first describes how her community of lesbian feminist activists worked tirelessly on behalf of 
Garcia. But in the months after her conviction, a deep-seated frustration set in. When a friend 
tells them that a local woman has been raped, the group exacts a plan to seek retribution. The 
plot is to “capture him, take him to the judge’s house, and tie him to the base of a huge tree with 
a note about his crime.”138 She continues:  
We had no reason to believe that the police or any other authorities would do anything except 
laugh at us, ignore or further mistreat her, make a joke. Inez with her rifle and her sense of 
‘women’s honor’ represented an end to this, a sea change of the seriousness with which 
women were beginning to take our treatment at the hands of men and at the hands of society 
that hypocritically pretended to protect us. Inez was about women taking the matter on for 
ourselves. We thought that by taking an action, we could be supportive of Inez.139  
 
                                                            
136 Karen Lindsey et al., “Rape: The All American Crime,” in Dear Sisters: Dispatches from the 
Women’s Liberation Movement, ed. Rosalyn Baxandall and Linda Gordon.  (New York: Basic 
Books, 2000), 195. 
137 Grahn, A Simple Revolution, 214-220.  
138 Ibid., 218. 
139 Ibid.  
 
 
37 
 
Though the incident came to naught (they failed to find the man after driving around for hours), 
her explanation of their motivation is revealing in itself. Grahn perceived the plot as a direct 
extension of their advocacy for Garcia.  
Grahn’s account is by no means exceptional. In their 1975 booklet, the Free Inez Garcia 
Committee remarks that feminist “tactics” include both actions “to prevent rape as well as taking 
collective action following a rape.” In other words, it entails both preventive and retributive 
methods, hinged on women’s solidarity: “The most essential element for any activity is to get 
together with women you can trust.” More specifically, they recommend simple “publicity” 
efforts, such as putting up posters to ruin a rapist’s reputation. Another suggestion includes 
“retaliation” strategies, for instance, in openly harassing rapists with “midnight phone calls, tire 
slashing, broken windows….” Most notably, the authors emphasize a starkly anti-state position: 
“Remember the issue of security and visibility if using such tactics, for a libel suit would be a 
possible result, and though we might prove our charges, being caught in the Man’s legal system 
ties up our energy.”140 
But other feminists explicitly objected to these tactics. The May 1975 issue of Ms. 
Magazine headlining Garcia’s first trial frankly illustrates the main point of contention. The 
cover features a close-up photo, taken by Annie Leibovitz, of a despondent-looking Garcia (her 
eyes tearstained),” juxtaposed with a banner that reads “Rape Victim or Murderer? Inez Garcia 
on Trial.” The fact that Ms. Magazine’s cover questions the very terms of Garcia’s status—as 
victim or killer—is significant. Scholar Amy Erdman Farrell remarks of the magazine’s national 
reach: “Ms. almost immediately became the popular icon of the women’s movement, 
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synonymous, for many Americans, with the women’s movement itself.”141 In her article for the 
issue, Gloria Steinem asks: “Yet, what do we do with the rage? It is clearly there—and, if 
combined with little faith in legal remedies, it seems sure to produce vigilantism. Our question 
must be: At what cost to women?”142 Though Steinem is inconclusive, her use of the term 
“vigilantism” denotes a point of fracture in the veneer of seamless support for Garcia. More 
specifically, it indicates that some feminists saw the time gap between Garcia’s assault and her 
shooting of Jiminez as evidence of vigilante justice—not righteous self-defense or even the 
justifiable outcome of rape trauma. In another example, Wood describes a scene in Garcia’s 
pretrial campaign when she meets with a “Monterey anti-rape group” and relays “she was glad 
she’d killed Miguel Jiminez and wished she’d killed his accomplice. The women, themselves 
rape victims, were shocked.”143 Wood attributes the negative reaction to class differences in 
which these “mostly middle class” women “found naked hate frightening.”144  
Part of the problem was that in spite of claims to a collective identity, or “a crowd of 
women” defenders, the feminist movement failed to agree on the ultimate goal or even the more 
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immediate tactical objective of feminist self-defense initiatives.145 This issue is immediately 
clear when considering the sheer diversity of techniques that often coexisted in a single source. 
For instance, a Los Angeles Times listing in August 1975 advertised a feminist self-defense rally 
hosted by the group Orange County Stop Rape Inc. The agenda for the day included “dispensing 
whistles,” self-defense training, and the distribution of fliers with information on Garcia’s 
trial.146 In yet another example, a reporter for the Chicago Tribune described a slew of vigilante 
episodes—in particular one in which a group of Florida feminists “slashed” an alleged rapist—in 
addition to martial arts training.147 She writes of the sundry tactics within this emergent women’s 
self-defense platform, “The approaches and philosophies vary, and some recommend jabbing 
combs, keys, bottle openers, and cork screws into attackers’ faces. Others give specific advice on 
how to aim umbrellas and other sharp objects most effectively.”148  
 In a 1975 article for off our backs, Marlene Schmitz reports on a conference held by the 
D.C. Coalition to Support Inez Garcia and Joann Little [sic]. Her description of the scene 
highlights this general incoherence and a sense of ambiguity among Garcia advocates in exacting 
a long-term objective. She writes: 
The experiences of the speakers with the police and courts hardly pointed to these 
institutions as our source of defense. Yet, when a woman in the audience told us that she 
had been receiving calls from a man threatening her with murder, the response was ‘call 
the police,’ followed by an air of bewilderment which hung over the rest of the 
conference.149 
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In another example, a 1974 news report of a feminist demonstration in Washington, D.C. 
describes a “heated debate” that ensued over the precise meaning of Garcia’s actions.150 A 
passerby asks the group to distinguish the exact goal of their activism: is it legal reform or 
vigilante justice? In response, a D.C. Rape Crisis Center worker “‘agreed that police and 
courtroom procedures had to be changed. ‘But until then,’ she said, ‘we have to take the 
protection of our dignity into our own hands.’”151 
This confusion in terms ultimately evidences the coexistence of legal and radical feminist 
strategies in campaign activism. That Garcia could not report her rape—out of familial shame, 
social fear, and police skepticism—was both logical and incendiary for activists. Some 
advocates, like the FIGC, articulated self-defense as an alternative to police and law. Notably, 
the group expressed an awareness of the racist dimensions of state violence:  
White men have been raping Black women since the time of slavery, when female slaves 
were outright chattels, to be used as the masters saw fit. The flip side of this is that Third 
World women are not believed when they report rape to the police.152  
 
But their anti-state rhetoric obscured the fact that Garcia’s campaign was never outside the legal 
realm, as the group simultaneously described their decision to work with Susan Jordan and called 
for a “genuine feminist self-defense” in the courtroom.153  
Other accounts support the fact that there was no distinct split between liberal and radical 
strategies in the campaign. In an article on U.S. feminist developments for the Irish Times, one 
activist describes how, in contrast to the 1960s, institutional and grassroots women’s groups 
worked in partnership for Garcia’s release: “In 1975, most of the issues which were originally 
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labeled as ‘women’s lib’ have become key issues for all women’s organizations. For example, 
nation-wide support has been generated for Jo-Ann Little [sic] and Inez Garcia, two women who 
have been charged with murder in rape-connected cases.”154 She continues: 
Support for both women has come from a broad spectrum of women’s groups, including 
the established women’s organizations, indicating the widening support for issues once 
viewed as ‘radical.’ The interest in Garcia and Little, two uneducated, minority group 
women, is also a new sign of solidarity between American women which is crossing 
racial and class lines.155  
 
Indeed, it is the theme of “solidarity” across racial and class lines that largely defined the self-
defense trials in the aftermath of her acquittal. But for the feminist antiviolence movement, the 
activist’s quote also signals a more complex layer of the Garcia campaign: the strong 
intermingling of grassroots and reform efforts in the push for her legal victory. In other words, 
though feminists diverged over the meaning of her case—as evidence of the need to change 
sexist and racist institutions, organize women’s self-defense classes, or consider vigilante-staged 
actions—their diverse political stances were always simultaneously about securing a feminist 
legal precedent for self-defense.  
At issue is, more generally, the epistemic foundation of Garcia’s universal symbolism. To 
be sure, this rhetoric proved powerful, even “visceral” for many activists.156 But in significant 
ways, Garcia was not representative of all women or even most rape victims. Here, I do not mean 
to imply that Garcia deviated from a more typical or normative victim, but rather to stress that 
there is no such thing. Carine Mardorossian, for instance, writes of the “…futility of looking for 
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common characteristics among women who are victims of sexual assaults.”157 In describing her 
own experiences as a feminist antiviolence activist, Mardorossian stresses that victims, sexual 
assaults, and their aftermaths are never monolithic and their meaning often changes “over 
time.”158 In other words, Garcia’s symbolic reach was both expansive and also overdetermined. 
Because the trial functioned as a stand-in for such an abundance of actual problems—as in the 
need for cathartic revenge imagery or as a representation of wholesale institutional injustice—the 
facts of her case are less visible.  
These points by no means invalidate Garcia’s personal struggle or her legal win. But they 
do have bearing on the larger implications of her case, considering the immense activism it 
inspired, for feminist antiviolence history. As Maria Bevacqua remarks, of a deeply troubling 
theme that links the popular feminist self-defense trials together, “Perhaps most significantly, not 
one of these three cases brought an accused rapist to trial in a courtroom.”159 While Garcia 
endured two legal battles and served a partial prison term, Castillo was never charged with 
rape—even after Garcia’s retrial. That the case was at base a murder trial signals that it has had 
less influence on feminist efforts to change the conditions for rape victims through police and 
law.160 Further, Victoria Law makes the distinctive point that the major feminist self-defense 
trials each represent “…more impersonal forms of violence.”161 Thus, Law notes, feminist 
backing of their causes coincided with the exclusion of movement interest in women with 
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extended histories of sexual abuse, or “battered women’s acts of self-defense.”162 Though 
Garcia’s case gestured at the problems rape survivors face in institutional settings, distinctions 
like Bevacqua’s and Law’s illustrate that the trial itself had at best minimal bearing on the larger 
problems in U.S. rape laws. 
Moreover, Garcia’s symbolic construction was not limited to feminists. Activists 
originally sought to cast Garcia as an icon of feminine defiance and a testament to unfair 
policies. But the general public often received a less subversive message. In her classic study 
Women Who Kill, Ann Jones observes that heightened interest in the topic of “female 
criminality” frequently turns up in periods when women’s rights are in flux and ultimately 
signals a more pervasive angst about transforming gender roles.163 Thus, lurid attention to the 
scandals of ‘violent women’ often bolsters conservative attacks on female autonomy at large by 
playing up the “fear that women, released from some traditional restraints, will turn to unbridled 
evil, mayhem, and murder.”164 Or, as Helen Birch succinctly puts it, “And precisely because she 
is relatively rare, the woman killer presents a far more dramatic spectacle than her male 
counterpart. Male violence is, after all, old news.”165 Thus, though many feminists sought to 
validate Garcia, tracking the media construction of her as a news item reveals the feminist 
agenda often took a backseat to more exploitative narratives.  
In her influential study Virgin or Vamp: How the Press Covers Sex Crimes, Helen 
Benedict describes the longstanding media practice of describing rape victims in the binaristic 
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terms of “virgin or vamp.”166 She writes, “As a result of the rape myths, a sex crime victim tends 
to be squeezed into one of two images—she is either pure and innocent, a true victim attacked by 
monsters—the ‘virgin’ of my title—or she is a wanton female who provoked the assailant with 
her sexuality—the ‘vamp.’”167 At the outset, the press ostensibly endowed Garcia with the 
qualities of, to use Maria Del Drago’s term, “a hapless victim,”168 a faithful wife and mother who 
had been “plucked from an obscure, drab existence.”169 Tinged with racial, ethnic, and class-
based bias, the New York Times reported on her apparent resilience in the face of pitiable 
obstacles: “Despite her lack of education, history of emotional problems, and marriage at age 15, 
Mrs. Garcia seems to possess pockets of strength.”170 Following her 1974 conviction, however, 
the tone shifted drastically. Almost immediately the term “slaying” replaced “murder” as the 
preferred buzzword in headlines.171 In turn, focus shifted to her callous lack of remorse and 
courtroom outbursts as evidence of revenge in the place of self-defense. That media frequently 
framed Garcia as unhinged and combative starkly contrasts with the larger feminist goal to 
normalize women’s anger and violence in reaction to assault. Consider, for instance, the 
cumulative impact of sexist language in the following excerpt from the October 1974 issue of 
People Magazine:  
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Hers was not, insisted the sultry Mrs. Garcia, a simple act of cold-blooded murder. 
Rather, she told a Monterey, Calif. court this month, she had gone looking for Jiminez in 
a vengeful rage last March less than an hour after he and a friend, Luis Castillo, had 
dragged her from her Soledad apartment and Castillo had raped her. ‘I’d have walked all 
night to find them!’ she snarled from the witness stand. ‘I’m only sorry I missed Luis!’172  
 
Yet an even more important lens for understanding the media’s gendered construction of Garcia 
is her Puerto Rican and Cuban heritage. In another essay for the May 1975 issue of Ms. 
Magazine, Maria Del Drago writes that the general public perceived Garcia as a highly 
contradictory figure, an “enigma of passivity and defiance” because they lacked context: of 
Latina cultural traditions and the embedded connections between “macho” familial ideals, 
religious conviction, and an intermingling of shame, respect, and “fierce pride.”173 She elaborates 
on Garcia’s actions at her first trial, “So in the courtroom, hearing her humiliation treated as 
irrelevant and her own word disbelieved or denied, this Latina pride burst forth.”174 While many 
have noted Garcia’s Latina identity as a factor in generating widespread coalitional support, less 
consideration has been given to the discrete ways it structured her representation. Kimberly 
Nichele Brown suggests, for instance, that Garcia received considerably less media scrutiny than 
Joan Little—despite the fact that both were minority women.175 She writes, “Garcia was a devout 
Catholic mother and a woman of a lighter complexion than Little, and much was made of her 
beauty and sexual innocence.”176 But Brown’s comment misses the way beauty later functioned 
in tandem with Garcia’s flare-ups in court at her first trial.177  
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That Garcia was primarily described in terms of her feminine beauty and highly erratic 
nature are in fact mainstays of stereotyping Latina identity through static binaries. Deborah 
Vargas writes that Latina women are often framed through “extreme representations as either 
hot-blooded spitfire or dutiful mother.”178 She continues, on its broader function, “In a U.S. 
context, then, representations of Latina sexuality as hot-blooded and excessive become the 
markers of what is morally wrong, set against the good morals and hegemonic U.S. citizenship 
values of non-Latino whites.”179 A brief survey of some phrases media attached to Garcia 
highlights this point: “black-eyed, black-haired, beautiful”; “attractive”; “screamed in anger”; 
“hunted down”; “haughty, bitter, and vengeful.”180 In this sense, Garcia traversed both poles of a 
flattened stereotypical narrative. 
Prior to the retrial, another common thread was to blame “militant feminists” outright for 
her conviction.181 For example, Robert Kirsch, in a 1976 review of Jim Wood’s journalistic 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
and Green, writing in Ms. Magazine, state, “Half Cuban and half Puerto Rican, velvety beautiful 
and model elegant, Inez Garcia herself seemed more likely to be on an RC Cola billboard in 
Spanish Harlem than sitting there at the defendants’ table, a political symbol on trial for murder.” 
See Blitman and Green, “Inez Garcia on Trial,” 52. 
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account on the trial, directly castigates feminist theatrics and their unfeminine behavior for 
interfering with the trial: “But the true believers—with their hissing, comments, street theater in 
and outside the courtroom, biases loudly expressed, with their showing off and patronizing 
condescension—did not help Inez.”182 He continues by stating that feminists “certainly helped 
convict her” with their “arrogant ideological imperialism that made them believe they were 
doing her a favor by promoting her martyrdom.”183 Another reviewer, displaying a blatant 
heterosexist prejudice toward feminists, writes, “It’s hard not to agree with the prosecutor that 
Inez’s supporters—two of whom appeared in court wearing goatees and men’s clothing—hurt 
her case. It’s a shame.”184 This is evidenced, for example, in the deliberately alarmist headlines 
connecting feminism and violence that featured prominently in press coverage of the case. Some 
striking examples include “Feminists back killing of assailant” and “Men are going to be 
killed.”185 Thus, Garcia was by no means afforded the label of a worthy victim; instead at best 
her victim status was often hollowed (as a ploy for the “militant feminist” agenda) or outright 
denied (in revenge narratives).  
But the issue as to whether Garcia spoke for herself or if supporters scripted her to 
advance a political platform was not limited to conservative media. Jim Wood, for instance, 
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describes Garcia as “shy” and “apolitical” in early Defense Committee demonstrations.186 But 
with feminist support, she “gradually became able to speak in public, giving a clenched fist with 
her talk.”187 Likewise, Susan Jordan has described Garcia as an entirely hesitant feminist icon: 
“‘She hated every minute of it. She was a very reluctant symbol of the women’s movement. She 
would go out there and carry on, talk about women, but this was not her milieu. She did not 
welcome this role. After the trial ended, she left the next morning.’”188 Del Drago remarks that 
underlying the motif of Garcia as a simple pawn of the women’s movement is the “racist 
assumption that she could not possibly be making her own decisions.”189 But the refrain of 
feminist manipulation is less an issue to be proved than it is a lens by which to open up broader 
questions about agency and feminist tactics.  
In other words, one problem in deciphering this aspect of the trial is that Garcia’s own 
voice is strikingly absent beyond media and legal accounts. In their article “Survivor Discourse: 
Transgression or Recuperation?” philosophers Linda Alcoff and Laura Gray describe the 
problematic rhetorical politics of disclosing trauma in both venues.190 They argue that feminist 
calls for sexual assault survivors to “speak out” fail to account for the possibility of exploitative 
co-optation by dominant discourses like the law or media.191 Alcoff and Gray depict this 
repressive potential by submitting “survivor speech” to Michel Foucault’s account of the 
Christian confessional: “…although confessional modes of discourse may appear to grant 
survivors an empowering ‘permission to speak,’ they give the expert mediator the power to 
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determine the legitimacy of survivor discourse.”192 In turn, experts—such as judges, therapists, 
or journalists—are entrusted with the task of the interpretation and authentication of a victim’s 
narrative. Not only is survivor autonomy diminished, but disclosures are likely to be deemed 
either pathological or “sensational.”193 Departing from Foucault, however, Alcoff and Gray 
contend that we should not give up on survivor speech altogether, but instead “create new 
discursive forms and spaces in which to gain autonomy within this process.”194 
Alcoff’s and Gray’s arguments about the challenges for “survivor speech” point to more 
base-level problems on the subject of activist manipulation in Garcia’s trial. Specifically, the 
media frequently circumscribed Garcia’s testimony so as to sensationalize her story while 
mapping her onto a specific stereotype.  As in, for instance, the single line carried by numerous 
news sources and emphasizing only her lack of remorse: “‘I killed the guy and I missed Luis but 
I meant to kill him too,’ she said. ‘The only thing is that I’m sorry I missed Luis.’”195 Further, 
Garcia had to recount the details of her rape in the courtroom not once but twice—an arena that 
ultimately forestalls “survivor speech” by leaving it open to authoritative discretion. At one 
level, her retrial—particularly for Jordan’s focus on her rationality and sexist discrimination in 
the law—signals one answer to their call for “new discursive forms” within institutional settings. 
Yet it is striking that many remarked that Garcia appeared “demure” and “a model of decorum” 
in her 1977 retrial, as opposed to her “volatile” demeanor in the first trial.196 In effect, it 
illustrates that inroads within the law are at best partial. In their 1975 report for Ms. Magazine, 
Blitman and Green remark of the trial: “But in the end, the courtroom turned out to be a poor 
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forum for big issues.”197  Most likely, the authors intended the comment in the direct context of 
her 1974 conviction (in which case their appraisal was premature). But the statement strikingly 
anticipates the much broader and deeply troubling dynamic between feminist activism and legal 
reform.  
For the feminist anti-violence movement in the 1970s, the legal battles of Inez Garcia—
“the rape victim who fought back”—offered what appeared to be an expansive platform by 
which activists could generate dialogue around core issues: the inefficacy of police; the blatant 
sexism of the law; and the necessity of self-defense initiatives.198 Further, as evidenced in the 
diverse groups that worked for Garcia’s acquittal, these messages proved salient for many. But 
underlying the theme of widespread solidarity is the fact that feminists diverged over the precise 
meaning of Garcia’s actions. For many radical feminists, Garcia signaled a heroic image of 
female power in stark contrast to the female murder victims that made headlines that year. 
Following from her early construction as a movement symbol, Garcia also became part and 
parcel of a radical feminist “political” campaign to end patriarchal rape. Some activists 
interpreted her 1974 conviction as evidence of the need for vigilante-based actions to be taken up 
by local feminist collectives. Still other feminists used Garcia’s narrative for a more imaginative 
politics through revenge fantasies or a poetic exploration of trauma and violence. And finally, 
other activists refused to condone Garcia—was she a victim or murderer (as Ms. Magazine’s 
1975 cover posed it)? Yet even worse than some feminists’ disavowal was the mainstream 
media’s sensationalized coverage of her case which constructed her—through specific 
stereotypes—as a hollow victim or a vengeful “huntress.”199 In tracking the process of politics 
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over the course of her campaign, Garcia’s acquittal is not simply a testament to meaningful and 
broad-based feminist activism. Her legal win has had at best a minimal bearing on the larger 
problems of institutional racism and sexism.  
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